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Abstract
Systemic  risk  in  the  financial  system  presents  a  daunting  challenge  for  the 
regulators  of  the  industry  worldwide.  The  behavior  of  financial  institutions  may 
create risks for the functioning of the whole economy, and in spite of theoretical 
understanding  of  these  risks,  their  measurement  and  regulation  still  faces 
considerable challenges.
This thesis studies the empirical assessment of systemic risk measures. A wealth of 
literature on the theory and measurement of systemic risk exists, yet there is little 
work on the assessment of the proposed measures. The assessment is challenging 
because  of  a  gap between proposed  measures  and economic  theory,  diversity  of 
these measures, as well as econometric issues and lack of data.
I review existing literature on systemic risk in order to better understand these 
challenges.  I  also  present  an  empirical  evaluation  of  one  particular  method  of 
estimating systemic risk with the SRISK measure, and point out its shortcomings. My 
main finding is that while the SRISK measure may be useful for the measurement of 
systemic  risk,  its  usefulness  is  limited  by  the  sensitivity  to  underlying  modeling 
choices, and a more thorough empirical understanding of SRISK is necessary before 
it can be considered as a tool for systemic risk regulation.
Keywords  systemic risk, macroprudential regulation, financial crises, risk measures
Contents
1 Introduction 5
2 Theoretical Framework 7
2.1 Sources of Systemic Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.1 Systemic Risk-Taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.2 Contagion Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.3 Amplification Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Regulatory Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Regulator’s Problem and Systemic Crisis . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.2 Contemporary Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.3 Practical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Measurement of Systemic Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.1 Theoretical Foundations of Systemic Risk Measures . . . 18
2.3.2 Types of Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.3 Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 Evaluation of Systemic Risk Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 Empirical Methodology 29
3.1 Conceptual Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 SRISK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.1 Earlier Assessments and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.2 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.3 Parameter Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.4 Estimating LRMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4 Results 47
4.1 Systemic vs. Systematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2 Comparisons with Alternative Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5 Discussion 57
5.1 Interpretation of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2 Limitations of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6 Conclusion 61
References 63
3
List of Tables
1 Summary statistics for the main dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2 OLS regression of SRISK on CAPM beta . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3 Systemic risk rankings for a selection of U.S. financial institutions 51
4 Regression of SRISK on the G-SIB buckets . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5 Regression of SRISK with simulated LRMES on the G-SIB buckets 56
List of Figures
1 Aggregate SRISK in the financial system over time . . . . . . . 44
2 CAPM beta and SRISK, average cross-section . . . . . . . . . . 48
3 CAPM beta and SRISK, time series for Bank of America . . . . 48
4 CAPM beta and SRISK as of 31 December 2015 . . . . . . . . . 50
5 The relationship between SRISK figures and the G-SIB buckets 52
6 Rank correlation over time between SRISK and three different
risk indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7 SRISK and leverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8 SRISK, both with simulated and static LRMES . . . . . . . . . 55
9 The relationship between SRISK figures with simulated LRMES
and the G-SIB buckets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4
1 Introduction
The measurement and management of systemic risk has attracted considerable
attention in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. Usually
the discussion of systemic risk focuses on the possibility of a failure of a finan-
cial institution spreading to others and causing a negative effect on the real
economy, but it is still a concept that lacks a unified definition (Benoit et al.,
2017).
Measuring and managing systemic risk is a timely topic for regulators and
the financial industry. The prevalent approach to mitigating systemic risk has
been microprudential (i.e. firm-level) regulation that might not be sufficient
for dealing with shocks that affect the system as a whole (Acharya et al.,
2017). This presents a need for a well-defined and practically relevant way of
measuring an institution’s contribution to the overall systemic risk.
The primary justification for managing and regulating systemic risk comes
from the negative externality it imposes on both the financial system and the
real economy. The global financial crisis showed that a crisis in the financial
industry can lead to a systemic shock that has considerable effects on the real
economy as well, and the measures of systemic risk attempt to capture the
firm-level contributions to the risk of this kind of systemic crisis. If successful,
a measure of systemic risk will link an individual firm with the system as
a whole, and not only assess the firm in isolation as most microprudential
measures do.
In this thesis, I examine the methods developed for measuring systemic risk.
I approach this topic both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective,
although my focus is in the empirical validation of the proposed systemic risk
measures. In particular, I am interested in capital shortfall –based measures, as
they have received the most attention in the literature and their clear intuition
and simple calculation makes them promising from a real-world regulatory
perspective. Despite their simplicity, they can still be extended to incorporate
more complex features, for example in the case of the SRISK measure by
Brownlees and Engle (2017). The SRISK measure, calculated for an individual
institution, attempts to capture the expected capital shortfall – in other words,
required bailout funds – that a firm would incur in the event of a systemic
crisis. SRISK can also be aggregated for the whole financial system in order
to estimate the total costs of a systemic crisis.
I begin my thesis by reviewing the literature and theoretical framework
of systemic risk in section 2, and then go on to present my own empirical
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methodology for examining the SRISK measure in section 3. Section 4 presents
my results, and in section 5, I discuss the results in the context of the existing
literature. Section 6 concludes this thesis.
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2 Theoretical Framework
While lacking a unified definition, systemic risk is still described fairly uni-
formly in the literature. In this work, I consider systemic risk to be the risk
that adverse financial conditions of one financial institution spread to oth-
ers through contagion effects and consequently have negative effects on the
real economy. The latter part of this definition is sometimes dropped (Benoit
et al.). More specifically, I characterize the “adverse conditions” as capital
shortfall which will be discussed in more detail in section 3.1. This approach is
consistent with e.g. Acharya et al. (2012). Another characteristic of systemic
risk is that it can be – and for regulatory purposes, should be – decomposed
into contributions of individual institutions. This notion is closely related to
the theory of systemic risk measurement, which I discuss in section 2.3.1. It
should also be noted that while this work and the literature I survey concern
systemic risk in the financial system, the concept itself is applicable to other
kinds of systems as well (Chen et al., 2013).
Risks of financial institutions and of the whole system are frequently dis-
cussed in terms of categories such as market risk, liquidity risk, credit risk,
etc. Systemic risk differs from this kind of source-based categorization in the
way that it encompasses risks from different sources, and the focus is not so
much on where the risk “comes from” but on the mechanism and possible
consequences, i.e. contagion in the financial system and spillover to the real
economy. The actual losses that trigger the realization of systemic risk may
be caused by market price movements (market risk) or freezing of the markets
(liquidity risk), for example.
An important characteristic of systemic risk is that actions by individual
financial institutions create a negative externality on the real economy that
is not internalized by the market. The reasons for this have been studied
extensively in the literature. Benoit et al. provide a review on the topic, and
I follow their exposition in the following section. But first, in order to better
illustrate the framework and sources of systemic risk, I present a conceptual
model described by Benoit et al.
The financial system consists of N financial institutions1, which are indexed
with i. Each of the institutions faces a risk exposure xi. Of this exposure, the
proportion αi is considered systematic and the proportion 1 − αi is idiosyn-
cratic. A systematic shock affects all the institutions at the same time and can
1For the purposes of this thesis, the terms financial institution and bank can be considered
interchangeable, unless stated otherwise.
7
be understood, for example, in the context of the CAPM framework.2 The
systematic exposure of institution i is thus defined as ySi = αixi, and the id-
iosyncratic exposure as yIi = (1 − αi)xi. For the whole system, the aggregate
exposure to systematic risk is denoted yS =
∑N
i=1 y
S
i . There are links between
the institutions, given by the N × N matrix B. The elements bi,j denote the
amount of i’s exposure to j, in practice in the form of derivatives contracts or
interbank loans, for example.
As usual, the counterpart of risk is return. In this framework, just like
risks, returns can also be attributed to systematic and idiosyncratic factors.
The return on the systematic factor is denoted by rS+εS, where rS is a constant
and εS is a random variable with zero mean. Analogously, the returns on the
idiosyncratic factor can be denoted ri+ εi, with εS and εi being independently
distributed.
A benchmark payoff (or profit) pˆii, corresponding to the payoff of an in-
stitution that is the only one in the system, can be described as a function
pˆii(y
S
i , y
I
i , ε
S, εi). For example, the payoff could be specified as:
pˆii = (r
S + εS)× ySi + (ri + εi)× yIi (1)
In this kind of framework, a systematic shock would be captured by εS, and
the risk related to that factor can be called systematic risk.
However, systemic risk is more than only systematic risk. The institution i
belongs to a system (or network) of financial institutions that can be described
with B. Systemic risk is characterized by the actual payoff pii being different
from the benchmark payoff pˆii. The links between financial institutions makes
the payoff for i dependent on the exposures of other financial institutions and
the idiosyncratic shocks they face. Formally, with the N×1 vectors εI, yS, and
yI denoting the idiosyncratic shocks, systematic exposures, and idiosyncratic
exposures, respectively, of all the N institutions, the actual payoff pii can be
described as follows:
pii = pii(y
S,yI,B, εS, εI). (2)
Sources of systemic risk are, in theory, captured by identifying the determi-
nants of the joint distribution of pii, i.e. which factors affect the set of realized
2 CAPM refers to the Capital Asset Pricing Model which describes asset returns as a
function of i.a. a systematic market risk factor. The model is explained briefly in section
3.1.
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payoffs in the systemic context. The actual systemic risk realization, or sys-
temic crisis, may be defined as the sum of all the pii falling below a certain
threshold, for example.
2.1 Sources of Systemic Risk
Following Benoit et al., three main categories of the mechanisms behind sys-
temic risk can be identified: systemic risk-taking, contagion effects, and am-
plification effects. I describe these mechanisms in the context of the above
framework and summarize the literature, following Benoit et al., on each one
of them.
2.1.1 Systemic Risk-Taking
Systemic risk-taking occurs when different institutions end up choosing similar
risks and taking large exposures. In the context of the framework above, having
similar risks is interpreted as high αi, and large exposures as high xi. There
have been several theoretical studies as to why this kind of systemic behavior
arises.
A quite intuitive explanation why institutions might have similar risks is
that they might have invested in the same assets. As summarized by Benoit
et al., one reason for investing in the same (or very similar) assets is that a
failing bank imposes a negative externality on other institutions through sig-
naling effects or demand for investments. There is an incentive to minimize
this externality by moving towards a situation where banks would either sur-
vive or fail together. Another example of herding behavior is brought about by
regulation itself. Also in this scenario, banks have an incentive to fail together
in the case that failures occur, so that government would have to organize a
bailout for all of them. Should a bailout or a stimulus be applied, the expected
positive effects would be maximized when a large number of the banks would
be in the receiving end.
Systemic risk-taking may also occur in the context of liquidity risk. Bhat-
tacharya and Gale (1987) show how banks may underinvest in liquid securi-
ties, increasing the possibility of a liquidity shortage in the market. From the
welfare-maximizing point of view, some banks should invest in liquid assets in
order to be able to provide funding to those institutions that might be in an
9
acute need of liquidity. However, in equilibrium, all banks underinvest in the
most liquid assets and rely on the other banks to provide liquidity if needed.
When there is a liquidity shock in the economy, the whole system suffers if
banks have too much invested in illiquid assets. Thus, all institutions have a
high exposure to a systematic liquidity shock.
The realization of systemic risk may be connected to tail risks, i.e. very
improbable events which can cause high losses. Tail risks are difficult to price
because of their low probabilities that cannot be estimated very reliably (or
at all). The literature summarized by Benoit et al. point out deficiencies
in regulations that have incentivized banks, for example before the recent
financial crisis, to accumulate tail risks into the shadow banking system, i.e.
outside their own balance sheets. Another concern is that investors in the
institutions that take excessive tail risks may not be able to recognize the risks
and maintain discipline.
The leverage cycle is another well-studied phenomenon that may cause the
exposures (xi in the model above) of different institutions to be correlated. The
idea is that during a boom, when asset prices are rising, agents in the economy
are able to borrow more, as borrowing is restricted by the value of collateral.
These constraints affect all institutions in a similar way. Related topics include
the procyclicality of some risk management and regulatory measures, such as
VaR3, and the literature on bubbles.
2.1.2 Contagion Effects
A crucial feature of systemic risk is the possibility for contagion. In the theo-
retical framework, the contagion occurs through the bilateral links bi,j between
financial institutions. An empirical criterion for contagion is that the payoffs
of two institutions with bilateral links are positively correlated even in the
absence of a systematic shock, formally: Cov(pii, pij|εS = 0) > 0. The initial
shock may thus be an idiosyncratic shock εi in one institution. In theory, the
observation of contagion would of course require an observation of a causal
relationship from one institution’s payoffs to another’s, but that requirement
may be very difficult or impossible to fulfill in practice. Several mechanisms
related to bilateral contagion and effects on the stability of the system have
been studied in the literature.
3VaR, or value-at-risk, is some low quantile (e.g. 5%) of the distribution of payoff out-
comes.
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There have been several studies on how the whole network of links B affects
systemic risk. As described by Allen and Gale (2000), the links don’t only act
as contagion channels but may also add robustness to the system by allowing
banks to share risks. The trade-off between contagion and risk-sharing effects
is determined by the completeness of the network, i.e. whether all institutions
are linked to each other. If bi,j is positive for all institution pairs, the network
is more robust than in the situation where some institutions are connected
only through a third institution. Contagion effects may propagate through
institutions, but risk-sharing is only possible for institutions that have a direct
connection.
Another point of view to the literature of banking networks is to study
how networks are determined by profit-maximizing institutions in equilibrium.
Leitner (2005) describes a network where institutions are willing to organize
private-sector bail-outs for failing institutions. In spite of the threat of conta-
gion, banks may ex ante find it optimal to create linkages between each other to
obtain implicit mutual insurance. In addition to these theoretical models, there
are also empirical studies to the shapes of real-world banking networks. Many
of them, as summarized by Benoit et al., are formed in a core-periphery fash-
ion. Constructing sophisticated models of financial networks with real-world
data forms a basis for measuring systemic risk in some studies, as summarized
by Bisias et al. (2012).
The details of the infrastructure for interbank transactions may also con-
tribute to the contagion effects. This strand of literature is concerned with
issues such as net vs. gross settlement and central counterparties. Even if the
underlying economics of the transactions remain same, infrastructure choices
may have an effect on how large the actual linkages bi,j between individual
institutions turn out to be. Zawadowski (2013) presents a model in which
a single default can lead to a systemic crisis, arguing that having a central
counterparty could mitigate the systemic risk.
2.1.3 Amplification Effects
The possibility of a relatively small shock having a large effect on the payoffs
of the institutions is called amplification. If a shock affects an institution, it
might have an incentive to behave in such a way that further amplifies the
shock for other institutions. The larger the aggregate exposure to the shock,
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the bigger the effect:
∂2E(pii)
∂εS∂yS
> 0.
An intuitive example of an amplification effect is a self-reinforcing liquidity
crisis. Financial institutions may face constraints on their funding and collat-
eral requirements, which are influenced by market prices. If market prices of
some assets drop, institutions may be forced to liquidate positions on those
assets, further contributing to the price decline. This vicious circle may lead
to a large liquidity shock. This effect, combined with increasing margin re-
quirements arising from the decreased liquidity, may force market participants
to sell other kinds of assets, too, thus creating contagion between asset classes.
An extreme case of liquidity shock is called a market freeze. These are char-
acterized by adverse selection and asymmetric information problems, which
may lead to banks ceasing interbank lending altogether. Adverse selection
may occur if banks cannot tell safe banks from risky banks, and banks that
are inherently safe but illiquid may not access funding from the interbank
market. This may also happen in a chain, where banks cease lending even
though they know their counterparties but don’t know the state of their coun-
terparties’ counterparties. An asymmetric information problem may occur if
some of the market participants are not aware how valuable the assets used as
collateral are.
There is a lot of literature on the inherent fragility of the financial system
that amplifies shocks. The probability of bank runs, studied for example by
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), is a classic example. Heavy reliance on short-
term funding is also one factor that has been argued to contribute to the
fragility of the system.
2.2 Regulatory Perspective
The presence of externalities creates a problem to be solved by the regulator. I
now demonstrate this problem formally and also take a look on the real-world
environment and practical issues in systemic risk regulation.
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2.2.1 Regulator’s Problem and Systemic Crisis
The regulator’s problem can be described using a conceptual framework of the
financial system. I follow Acharya et al. (2017) in this exposition, with slight
deviations from their notation in order to keep variables consistent with the
framework presented above.
Also here, the financial system consists of N banks (or financial institu-
tions). The difference to the model above is that here there are two time
periods t = 0, 1. In the economy, there are assets k = 1, . . . , K available, and
each bank chooses to aqcuire total assets ai, with investments sik, as follows:
ai =
K∑
k=1
sik. (3)
These investments can be financed with debt or equity. In the beginning, each
bank has an endowment w¯i0, of which wi0 is kept in the bank as equity capital
and the rest, w¯i0 − wi0, is paid out to the owner(s) as a dividend. For a bank,
there may be one single owner or several owners, but they are assumed to be
homogenous for a single bank in the context of this model. In addition to
equity, the bank is able to raise debt funding, with a market value di. The
budget constraint, which is equivalent to the basic accounting equation, is as
follows:
wi0 + d
i = ai. (4)
When the system moves on to time 1, each asset k pays off a return rik per
dollar invested. A bit like above, a benchmark payoff can be defined, which
this time stands for the total return from investments (bank revenue) in time
1, as follows:
pˆi =
K∑
k=1
riks
i
k. (5)
However, the bank may face financial distress, the costs of which are denoted
by φi. This leads to the actual market values of the bank’s assets at time 1:
pi = pˆi − φi. (6)
In turn, the distress costs themselves depend on the market value of the bank’s
assets and also the book value f i of the banks debt di, as follows:
φi = Φ(pˆi, f i). (7)
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The intuition here is that the bigger the bank and the more there is debt, the
higher the eventual distress costs are. Distress costs may be incurred even if
the bank doesn’t default. The specification is restricted here so that φ ≤ pˆ,
and thus p ≥ 0.
Two defining characteristics of banks in this framework are that a portion
of their debt is guaranteed by the government, implicitly or explicitly, and
as described in section 2.1, they impose a systemic risk externality in the
case of financial distress. Assuming that the government guarantee is public
information, the book value of the debt is set according to
di = γif i + (1− γi)E(min{f i, pi}), (8)
where γi is the proportion of the bank’s debt guaranteed by the government.
At time 1, the net worth wi1 of the bank can be specified as
wi1 = pˆ
i − φi − f i. (9)
The owner of the bank, protected by limited liability, receives the amount4
[wi1 > 0]× wi1. Now, the bank owner’s problem is
max
wi0,d
i,{sik}k
c× (w¯i0 − wi0 − τ i) + E(ui([wi1 > 0]× wi1)), (10)
subject to equations (4), (5), and (7)–(9). Above, ui([wi1 > 0] × wi1) is the
utility for the bank owner from the time 1 income and τ i is the bank’s tax.
The expression w¯i0 − wi0 − τ i denotes the part of the initial endowment that
is paid out as a dividend to the bank’s owner at time 0, and the parameter c
determines the utility from taking out dividends instead of keeping the capital
as equity in the bank. It can thus be understood as the opportunity cost of
equity capital, which may be influenced by characteristics of the two financing
methods or the bank owner itself.
Now to the regulator’s problem. The aim is to maximize total welfare,
given by R = R1 +R2 +R3. The first part is the utility to all bank owners:
R1 =
N∑
i=1
c× (w¯i0 − wi0 − τ i) + E
(
N∑
i=1
ui([wi1 > 0]× wi1)
)
. (11)
4I use the Iverson bracket notation, where [P ] =
{
1 if P is true;
0 otherwise.
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The second part is the expected cost of the government’s guarantee on bank
debt, given by:
R2 = E
(
g
N∑
i=1
[wi1 < 0]γ
iwi1)
)
. (12)
Here, the parameter g captures all the costs, direct and indirect, associated
with this guarantee. The guarantee is paid in the case of a default, in other
words when wi1 < 0. The final part, R3, is the most important one for this
analysis. It is given by
R3 = E(e× [W1 < zA]× (zA−W1)), (13)
where A =
∑N
i=1 a
i denotes the aggregate assets in the financial system and
W1 =
∑N
i=1w
i
1 is the aggregate capital in the system at time 1. If the aggregate
capital W1 falls below a certain threshold proportion z of the aggregate assets
A, there is a systemic crisis. The parameter e describes the change in the
severity of the crisis as aggregate capital continues to fall below the threshold
given by zA. When W1 ≥ zA, R3 = 0 and there is no systemic crisis, and
a bank default in a well-capitalized system may not trigger a systemic crisis
while a similar default in an undercapitalized system might. The negative ex-
ternality arises from the fact that an undercapitalized system will not be able
to supply credit to lending customers for their everyday business, leading to
problems in the real economy. The value of the threshold parameter is essen-
tially arbitrary, but it is needed to identify a systemic crisis. In a real-world
setting, the threshold would be chosen by the regulator to best characterize a
systemic crisis, possibly based on information from previous crises. It might be
worthwhile to note here also that this model does not comment on the actual
source (or cause) of the systemic crisis, i.e. why the capital has fallen, but it
is a concern for the theoretical literature summarized in section 2.1.
The regulator’s problem is to devise a tax system that maximizes total
welfare, formally
max
τ i
R1 +R2 +R3. (14)
This means that the regulator (or government) has to be able to align incen-
tives ex ante, so redistributions at time 1 are not possible. Actually, applying
redistributions to solve a systemic crisis when it has occurred is not preferable
ex ante, because it creates a moral hazard problem. Acharya et al. (2017)
present a detailed analysis of optimal taxation, and conclude that the tax for
an institution should be determined by two components: first, the expected
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loss on the institution’s debt guaranteed by the government, and second, the
expected costs of a systemic crisis multiplied by the institution’s relative con-
tribution to the undercapitalization. The second part is the systemic risk
component, the measurement (or estimation) of which is a central topic of
this thesis. In a separate contribution, Korinek (2011) shows that specifying a
capital requirement is equivalent to a tax.
2.2.2 Contemporary Environment
I take a quick look on contemporary methods of regulating systemic risk, fol-
lowing the survey by Benoit et al.
There are several measures that could be understood in the context of the
sources of systemic risk presented in section 2.1. Instead of systemic risk per
se, they attempt to tackle the systemic risk-taking that may act as precursor
to systemic risk, in addition to other risks. These measures5 include capital
ratios, stricter definition of capital, liquidity requirements, and countercyclical
capital buffers, for example. In the light of the framework in section 2.2.1,
their effect can be understood as decreasing the probability of W1 < zA.
However, without aligning incentives based on individual institutions’ systemic
risk contributions, they are not targeting the actual systemic risk externality
as it is understood here. Another form of regulation are regularly conducted
and published stress tests, which are more specifically attempting to identify
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). The current regulatory
framework for identifying systemically important banks is discussed in section
2.3.3.
When a crisis occurs, it will be optimal ex post if the regulator provides
relief to the financial system. This is what was seen in the recent financial
crisis as well. However, it is not optimal ex ante and it is a problem for the
regulators to convince the financial system that there will be no bailouts in
the future. Another important issue in the current regulatory environment is
the international nature of crises which would require stronger international
cooperation to prevent a “race to the bottom” in regulation. An example of
this cooperation is the Financial Stability Board (FSB), established by the
G20 in 2009 to foster cooperation and identify systemic weaknesses and SIFIs.
5For lack of a better word, I use the word measure here to refer to a regulatory policy
or instrument. It should not be confused with measure referring to e.g. a systemic risk
measure, or a unit of measurement. It should be clear from the context which interpretation
of the word is intended.
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2.2.3 Practical Considerations
While the theory behind systemic risk is fairly simple, there are some issues
that might affect the feasibility of regulating it in the real world. One of them
is the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976): changes in policy will affect the structure
of econometric models. As summarized by Bisias et al., if regulators were to
supervise and measure a certain metric and base decisions on that, that would
certainly affect the incentives of the financial institutions that both have an
effect on the measure and are also affected by it. One particular example of this
kind of effect is the shadow banking system, into which financial institutions
may shift their risks in order to avoid capital requirements based on their
balance sheet characteristics. Even though the banks may evade regulation
this way, the risks still remain.
It can be argued that systemic risk measurement and regulation would
have such benefits, especially in the presence of market imperfections, that the
general-equilibrium effects of changed institutional and individual expectations
would not overweigh them. This makes a case for regulating systemic risk
even while acknowledging that the Lucas critique might have a bearing on this
particular topic. However, any regulatory framework must take into account
any possible changes in the institutions’ behavior following the introduction of
the regulation, such as the possibility of shifting risks into the shadow banking
system.
As noted by Benoit et al., many of the tools proposed for systemic risk
regulation are quite new. They can also be quite heavy-handed from the
perspective of the banks if they target specific asset classes, and they may
have a reducing effect on lending. This, in addition to the Lucas critique,
presents a need to study and evaluate any regulation carefully before putting
it into practice.
2.3 Measurement of Systemic Risk
The regulation of systemic risk by e.g. capital requirements depends on spec-
ifying a measure to capture the systemic risk contribution of an institution. I
now turn to discuss how, and if, these contributions could be measured from
a theoretical point of view.
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2.3.1 Theoretical Foundations of Systemic Risk Measures
The systemic risk literature puts significant focus on studying and developing
measures that would give regulators the possibility to capture and mitigate
the systemic risk externalities of financial institutions. Keeping this in mind,
any measure of systemic risk must be able to satisfy certain conditions, so
that applying it as a tax or capital requirement would really fix the issue with
minimal external effects of its own.
Chen et al. present an axiomatic approach to the measurement of systemic
risk in order to determine the conditions for a theoretically justifiable systemic
risk measure. They present a one-period framework with a set of firms F and
a set of future scenarios Ω. An economy X is defined as a matrix of all the
firms and scenarios, namely X ∈ R|F|×|Ω|, where each element Xi,ω denotes the
loss of firm i in scenario ω. The vector of outcomes for each firm in a single
scenario is Xω ∈ R|F|. This is referred to as a cross-sectional profile of losses.
As an additional help to the exposition, unit loss vectors 1Ω and 1F are defined
as unit losses for one firm in all scenarios and for all firms in one scenarios,
respectively. Finally, a systemic risk measure ρ is a summary statistic that
quantifies the level of systemic risk in an economy X as a real number ρ(X).
Systemic risk measures can be compared as follows: if ρ(X) > ρ(Y ), the
economy Y is less risky and thus preferred to X.
Chen et al. define a single-firm risk measure ρ, for all loss vectors x, y of a
single firm, as satisfying the following conditions:
1. Monotonicity : If x ≥ y, then ρ(x) ≥ ρ(y). If losses in one scenario are
higher, then should the single-firm risk measure be, too.
2. Positive homogeneity : ρ(x) increases in proportion to losses.
3. Convexity : Diversification reduces risk, in other words the risk of a firm
diversified between outcomes x, y is less than or equal to the weighted
risks of firms corresponding to x and y.
4. Normalization: ρ(1Ω) = 1. This criterion fixes the scaling of the risk
measure.
A systemic risk measure is defined analogously. However, it introduces two
additional criteria. The convexity criterion is extended from the one above to
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incorporate not only outcomes, but also risks. With risk aversion, combined
economies yield lower uncertainty and thus increase welfare directly. The other
new criterion is preference consistency that allows for comparing two cross-
sectional profiles with each other. This is the main takeaway from the systemic
risk perspective, as a measure satisfying this criterion will be able to order
whole cross-sections according to preference relations, capturing the interaction
of many institutions.
This framework allows the theoretical assessment of systemic risk measures.
If a proposed measure fails to meet these criteria, its feasibility as a measure of
systemic risk is questionable. For example, if an economy X with much higher
expected losses than Y across the cross-section would receive a systemic risk
estimate ρ(X) < ρ(Y ), it would not be a very useful measure if losses are what
the regulator is trying to anticipate. Or, if with some measure there would
be no way of determining which one of two different economies is preferable
from a systemic risk point of view, the preference consistency criterion would
be violated and there would be little reason to call the measure a systemic risk
measure at all.
With the help of this framework, Chen et al. demonstrate that a systemic
risk measure can be decomposed to the contributions of different institutions,
and show that this risk attribution can account for the externalities caused by
the institutions and thus serve as a basis for the tax like the one described in
section 2.2.1. They also demonstrate that the risk measure can be character-
ized by two independent components: an aggregation function, that determines
the cross-sectional preferences, and a base risk measure, that determines the
preference over outcomes in different scenarios like the single-firm measure
presented above.
The approach in the SRISK measure, studied in more detail in section
3.2, is closely related the systemic expected shortfall (SES) measure described
briefly in the beginning of that section. The systemic expected shortfall is
studied by Chen et al. as a special case of the measures included in their
framework, which gives also SRISK theoretical justification.
2.3.2 Types of Measures
I now present a summary of proposed systemic risk measures. The measures
can be classified in various ways, and I present some classifications found in
the literature.
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Benoit et al. divide systemic risk measures into structural and global mea-
sures. Following the categorization presented in section 2.1, structural mea-
sures are those that target a specific source of systemic risk, i.e. systemic
risk-taking, contagion, or amplification. Systemic risk-taking has been esti-
mated with measures like correlation in banks’ portfolios and asset commonal-
ity. The latter is based on the intuition that the more banks’ portfolios overlap,
the more there is fragility in the system. Other ways to measure systemic risk-
taking include macroeconomic models describing the economy as either in a
normal or a “systemic risk state” and calculating the associated probabilities,
and dynamic models studying the development of and relationship between
VaR figures of GDP and financial portfolios.
The contagion effects have been measured mostly with network-theoretic
methods. The measures model the linkages between institutions and study
the transmission of insolvency across the network. The measures used to de-
termine an institution’s contribution to systemic risk may be e.g. distance–
or centrality-based figures. Amplification effects have been quantified using
structural models on e.g. leverage and liquidity, and systemic risk is measured
as the sensitivity to a shock.
Global measures, on the other hand, do not target a particular source of
systemic risk but attempt to capture the risk as a whole, using mostly data
from the financial markets. The idea is that a lot of information can be inferred
from market pricing of various securities, such as equity and derivatives. As
noted by Benoit et al., global measures of systemic risk have gained a central
position in the systemic risk literature, and the SRISK measure I study can
be included in this category.
Other kinds of classifications for systemic risk measures are presented by
Bisias et al. The measures can be classified using a temporal dimension, where
a systemic risk measure can be a forecasting measure, a contemporaneous mea-
sure, or even an ex-post measure, or a combination of these. The forecasting
measures are probably the most intuitive and it could even be argued that
they are the most useful kind of measures for the regulator. Measures that at-
tempt to achieve a high rate of forecasting power are typically focused on some
individual metric of the economy, such as consumer credit risk or hedge-fund
returns. There are also network-based measures that aim at providing an early
warning of accumulating imbalances in the system. Another kind of forecast-
ing measures include those based on stress tests, simulation, or some measure
of fragility in the financial system. Many of the measures serving as basis for
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stress tests target a particular asset class, instead of institutions, and they at-
tempt to capture the biggest sensitivities in the system for exogenous changes
in systemic variables. The SRISK measure is an example of a measure that
can be applied in conducting stress tests and identifying fragilities (Acharya
et al., 2014). Identifying fragilities is also a key point in using contempora-
neous measures, which attempt to provide useful and timely information for
managing a crisis that has already begun. Many of the measures suitable for
stress testing and short-term forecasting can also be applied for crisis monitor-
ing. The importance of ex-post measures is mostly in the orderly resolution of
failed institutions, where e.g. network-based measures may provide assistance
to dealing with complex asset portfolios.
Still another way of categorizing the systemic risk measures, also described
by Bisias et al., is looking at the methodological frameworks of these mod-
els. Measures like SES that attempt to capture the joint distribution of
negative outcomes for financial institutions can be classified as probability-
distribution measures. Default measures estimate the likelihoods of default
– on consumer credit, for example – and link them across financial institu-
tions. Techniques for these estimations include methods that are parametric
as well as non-parametric, such as machine learning –based. Contingent claims
analysis makes use of derivatives pricing models in estimating default proba-
bilities. A class of their own are illiquidity measures, which treat illiquidity
in the markets as an important source for systemic risk and try to estimate it
using models that are compared with observed market data. Network-based
measures model the connections between financial institutions using data on
interbank exposures, and there have been several studies using this kind of
methods to assess the externalities arising from bank failures. Commonality
of asset returns across the financial system can also be analyzed with network-
based measures, as well as methods such as principal component analysis. The
last category described by Bisias et al. is macroeconomic measures, which dif-
fers from all the above measures by its focus on macroeconomic models and
variables. The complexity of the real-world economy reduces the usefulness of
macroeconomic models in estimating systemic risk.
2.3.3 Challenges
The measurement of systemic risk presents empirical and practical challenges,
and some proposed measures have attracted criticism also from a theoretical
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point of view. In this section, I focus on shortfall-based measures, which have
their foundation in the framework presented in section 2.2.1. I present the
empirics of these measures in more detail in section 3.1.
The shortfall-based measures have been criticised for being atheoretical
(Bisias et al.). The criticism refers particularly to their lack of connection to
economic theory, not to the theoretical aspects of the measures themselves. In
other words, they may have a theoretical foundation such as the one presented
in section 2.2.1, but the connection to standard macroeconomic models is left
unexplained. From a theoretical point of view, this is a deficiency in the model
as its observations can be only interpreted in a limited context. They are also
indifferent in regard to the nature of the initial shock behind the crisis, which
might have a significant impact on how the crisis unfolds.
However, the lack of connection to economic theory does not necessarily
mean that using shortfall-based measures is futile. As Bisias et al. note, the
estimates of correlated losses produced by these models may serve as inputs
for more structured systemic risk models. Also, not being “fixed” to a certain
theoretical model of the economy the shortfall-based models may offer versa-
tility and provide useful information regardless of any theoretical assumptions
of the macroeconomy and the financial system.
In particular, the systemic expected shortfall (SES) has been studied in
more detail by Chen et al. in the context of their axiomatic framework of sys-
temic risk measures. As described in section 2.3.1, a systemic risk measure can
be decomposed into an aggregation function and a base risk measure. In the
case of SES, the base risk measure is the expected shortfall and the aggrega-
tion function can be interpreted as simply the sum of profits and losses across
the cross-section of firms. SES can thus be criticized for taking an approach
that treats the system like an investment portfolio and implicitly nets the
profits and losses of firms with each other. This kind of an approach presents
two issues. First, it might not be possible or desirable in the real world for
the regulator to compensate an institution’s losses with another institution’s
profits, even though it would be optimal from a portfolio management perspec-
tive. Second, the approach doesn’t allow for a detailed modeling of preferences
across cross-sections. For example, the regulator might have a view on whether
it would be preferable to have a single large loss in one institution or several
smaller losses in a higher number of institutions. The portfolio approach is
unable to differentiate between these cases if the total magnitudes of losses are
equal. These empirical limitations represent the tradeoff between theoretically
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simplistic models that are relatively easy to apply in practice, and complex
and more structured models that may suffer from lack of transparency and
real-world applicability.
Even though the new approaches may have limitations, the existing ap-
proaches for measuring and mitigating systemic risk have received criticism
as well. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has a frame-
work for analyzing the systemic importance of financial institutions (BCBS,
2013). It is a simple scoring methodology that aims to measure an institution’s
systemic importance by aggregating information on five categories, which de-
termine the scores that are then scaled to reflect the relative importance of that
institution in the system. Benoit et al. present a criticism of this approach.
The comparison of individual institutions to the whole system presents an is-
sue if there is a global shock that affects all institutions at the same time. The
indicator may give similar values as before, even though the risk levels have
changed. In the cross-section, the indicator may be useful but on the time-
series dimension it might not be that reliable. Another deficiency of the BCBS
approach is that the most volatile categories may dominate the changes in the
risk scores. Even though the explicit goal is to give each of the five categories
an equal weight, in reality those variables that change the most may determine
the changes in the scores. The remedy of BCBS is to apply a cap on some of
the categories, but Benoit et al. criticize it being a crude way of adjusting the
scores, and propose an alternative method of scaling based on standardizing
the variables based on their cross-sectional volatility.
Another common way of attempting to measure systemic risk is using stress
tests that simulate macroeconomic shocks in order to calculate an institution’s
capital requirement. These tests make extensive use of confidential supervisory
data provided by the banks. As noted in section 2.3.2, some systemic risk
measures may be used as alternatives to the regulatory stress test, which allows
the comparison between the approaches proposed in the literature and those
used by regulators. Acharya et al. (2014) compare the results from regulatory
stress tests with an alternative test based on SRISK, and find that especially
in Europe, the capital required by SRISK – a market-based measure – is higher
than that required by the regulatory tests, and even the ranking of institutions
is different between these two tests. They also find that the ratios of risk-
weighted assets to total assets in a 2011 European stress test have no link
with subsequent realized bank risks or a comparable measure calculated with
SRISK. They attribute the differences in the results to stress scenarios that
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were politically chosen to be weak and the static risk-weighting of assets. They
also argue that banks have an incentive to overconcentrate their assets into
those classes that have low risk weights, leading to a lack of diversification,
underestimation of risk weights, and excess leverage.
In addition to theoretical challenges, there are also empirical and practi-
cal challenges in implementing the proposed systemic risk measures. Perhaps
the most obvious practical problem in estimating these measures is the lack
of data. While some data can be collected from financial markets or public
accounting figures of financial institutions, many proposed measures require
data that might be difficult to gather. A case in point are the regulatory stress
tests, which rely on highly confidential data of interbank exposures. While
it might not be a problem for the regulator to calculate systemic risk capital
requirements from confidential data and with complex models, it is quite prob-
able that the more the approach resembles a black box for outside observers
the more it would receive opposition inside and outside the financial industry.
The network-based systemic risk measures mentioned above are another ex-
ample of potential methods of estimating systemic risk that would require a
lot of confidential data on interbank exposures to work properly.
The complexity of the calculation of a systemic risk measure is another
important consideration. While relatively simple models that only use public
data may be easy to implement in the real world, they might not be able to cap-
ture the full extent of systemic risk. However, the complexity of the calculation
framework may present practical obstacles if significant resources are required
to come up with the figures. Any errors in calculation may also be harder to
spot in complex models, and extensive use of accounting figures in the model
may be hampered by differing interpretations of accounting standards across
institutions. Also, if the regulator needed to be able to monitor systemic risk
development for example on a daily frequency, with detailed data on interbank
transactions and bank balance sheets, it would need an infrastructure for that
purpose. If the cost of such an infrastructure was high compared to the ben-
efits the model would bring in comparison to simpler systemic risk models, it
might be difficult to gain acceptance for that kind of a measure.
A simple measure based on market data may not be optimal from the
data requirement point of view either. Even if market data –based models
were found to be effective in measuring systemic risk, they would run into
problems when the institutions are privately owned and no data is available
on their equity prices, for example. A significant percentage of bank assets
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are in unlisted institutions, as reported by e.g. Alesina and Giavazzi (2010),
in whose sample the the proportion of bank assets in listed banks was 53%
in Europe and 47% in the U.S. in year 2006. There is no simple remedy into
this problem if only e.g. equity-based measures are used. Some of the larger
privately-owned banks might have issued other traded securities, such as bonds
that could provide some information on the market perception of the risks
associated with these institutions, but that would require shifting from purely
equity-based models to something else. Also, there are many small banks in
the system that most probably haven’t issued any securities on the markets.
A significant systemic crisis can emerge from a number of small institutions,
as evidenced by the US Savings and Loan crisis of the late 1980s, when over
1000 (mostly small) banks failed. For a more detailed account of the crisis,
see e.g. Curry and Shibut (2000). These limitations are critical if the market
data –based measures are to be used as the sole way of measuring systemic
risk, but these measures may still be able to provide useful information if used
in connection with or as an input into other measures.
In addition to the known problems and all idiosyncratic problems associ-
ated with individual research methods, a common challenge to implementing
the proposed systemic risk measures in practice is the lack of their empirical
evaluation. As Benoit et al. note, many of the tools are new and in order to
become viable regulatory instruments, their evaluation is an important topic
that deserves more attention. This thesis attempts to add especially to that
particular strand of systemic risk literature. Naturally, new evaluations of the
measures may also present novel challenges and questions.
Hansen (2012) presents an overview on the challenges related to systemic
risk measurement. He argues that even though model misspecification is a valid
concern, it is not a reason not to try and explore various proposed models and
provide insights for policy advice that way. Hansen stresses the importance of
sensitivity analysis when trying different models and expresses confidence that
even though there may be significant challenges at the moment, studying the
proposed measures will always increase the knowledge on systemic risk issues
and thus bring the work forward.
2.4 Evaluation of Systemic Risk Measures
As noted by e.g. Benoit et al. and Hansen, the evaluation of systemic risk
measures is an important research topic going forward. It is not only needed
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for regulatory purposes, but also to increase the understanding of systemic risk
in general.
The rationale for the evaluation of systemic risk measures is discussed by
Hansen. As the main justification for systemic risk measurement comes from
the needs of regulation, the regulator’s point of view is important also here.
He argues that if there wasn’t a commonly accepted framework for measur-
ing systemic risk, the regulator would rely on ad hoc measures and being
able to recognize systemic risk in the system when it is there. In addition
to possible methodological inconsistency, too much discretion on behalf of the
regulator would present problems also to the systemic risk mitigation process
itself. Hansen presents two reasons for this. First, discretionary policies are
vulnerable to political pressure. Second, even though discretion might allow
quicker reaction in unprecedented circumstances, the criticism and develop-
ment of policy would be quite challenging. In order to improve systemic risk
models and methods, also other parties than the regulator should be able to
participate in the systemic risk measurement discussion.
Hansen refers to the study by Bisias et al. that presents a multitude of
different systemic risk measures, summarized also here in section 2.3.2. Even
though the wealth of different measures presents a wide range of possible paths
for improving the understanding of systemic risk, Hansen also sees it as dis-
concerting. As many of the proposed measures derive from very different
backgrounds, any kind of systemic risk measurement framework that relies on
having these several different ways to quantify systemic risk could easily suffer
from lack of coherence. It is thus important to evaluate which measures work
and reject those that don’t.
A specific challenge that Hansen considers crucial is the differentiation of
systemic and systematic risk. This distinction has been discussed also in the
beginning of section 2. While systematic risk is a well-understood and well-
defined concept, the nature of systemic risk is not understood that well, and
distinguishing these two should be an important focus in further studies.
There seems to be no common framework for evaluating systemic risk mea-
sures. However, two main approaches can be identified: theoretical and empir-
ical evaluations. The latter seems to be much more common in the literature,
but there are also evaluations of systemic risk measures that focus on their
theoretical methodology. The paper by Chen et al. is a good example of this
kind of studies.
Benoit et al. summarize different approaches to empirically assessing sys-
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temic risk measures. What many of them have in common is that a systemic
risk measure is studied in the context of an identified realization of systemic
risk, the definition of which is different across studies. For example, the pa-
per by Brownlees and Engle presents the SRISK measure and evaluates it by
studying if institutions with a high SRISK were more likely to receive bailout
funds in the financial crisis of 2007–2009. As alternatives to bailouts, the re-
alization of systemic risk has been identified as bank insolvencies, accounting
losses and negative stock returns. Another approach, also illustrated in this
thesis, is comparing the rankings of several different systemic risk measures
with each other and with the bucket-level rankings provided by the FSB in
their annual list (see e.g. FSB, 2016). The intuition is that the regulators,
who have access to confidential data, can identify systemic risk based on that
data and rank the institutions accordingly. However, even if the regulator
might have superior knowledge in comparison to e.g. markets and academia,
their estimations may also suffer from shortcomings like the ones presented in
section 2.3.3, and they should not be considered as an absolute truth.
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3 Empirical Methodology
In the empirical section of this thesis, I present an empirical evaluation of the
SRISK measure, comparing it with a purely systematic risk measure (CAPM
beta) as well as with the list of systematically important institutions compiled
by the Financial Stability Board (2016). The purpose of this approach is to
determine if the SRISK appears to provide information about systemically
important institutions that can’t be provided by a purely market-based sys-
tematic risk measure. In addition to market data, SRISK takes into account
balance sheet characteristics of financial institutions.
I have chosen to study specifically the SRISK measure for three main rea-
sons. First, as noted by Benoit et al., SRISK is among the most studied and
discussed measures in the systemic risk literature. Any further understanding
on it would contribute to a growing body of work that may have significant
implications for regulatory policy in the future. Even though studying a lesser-
known measure might have a relatively bigger significance for the literature on
that particular measure, I argue that there are justified reasons for SRISK’s
popularity. This brings us to the second reason why I chose SRISK for my
topic. SRISK is intuitive and easy to use. SRISK fits well to the theoretical
framework described in section 2.2.1, as I present below in section 3.2. It also
overcomes many of the empirical challenges presented in section 2.3.3, as it
relies completely on public data, and it can be understood in the context of
the theoretical axioms of Chen et al. (section 2.3.1). There is also a lot of
readily available data on SRISK on the website of the Volatility Institute of
NYU Stern School of Business (V-Lab, 2017).
However, there is still research to be done on evaluating SRISK, which is the
third reason for my interest. There are conflicting accounts on the usefulness
of the SRISK measure in identifying systemic risk, and I will review the earlier
assessments briefly in section 3.2.1. There are also empirical limitations and
conceptual issues that may decrease the usefulness of SRISK, and I discuss
those in that section as well.
3.1 Conceptual Background
In order to understand the SRISK measure, I briefly explain the shortfall-
based methodology behind SRISK, as well as some other concepts needed to
understand the empirical framework. In this exposition, I follow Brownlees
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and Engle. The notation corresponds to that in earlier sections unless stated
otherwise.
The intuition behind the shortfall-based measures is described in section
2.2.1, where a capital shortfall in the economy causes a systemic crisis. The
financial distress of a financial institution is also measured as capital shortfall,
and for a particular firm it corresponds to the difference between the equity
capital the firm needs to hold and what it actually holds. The need for a certain
fraction of the firm’s assets to be equity may come from e.g. regulation or
prudential management practices. This prudential capital fraction is denoted
k. The capital shortfall of firm i on day t is defined as
CSit = kait − wit
= k(dit + wit)− wit,
(15)
where wit is the market value of the firm’s equity, dit is the book value of debt,
and ait = dit + wit is the quasi value of assets – so called as it incorporates
both book and market values. If the capital shortfall is positive, the firm is
in distress, and if it’s negative, the firm functions properly. In the context of
systemic risk measurement, the interest is in measuring the capital shortfall of
an institution conditional on a systemic crisis.
The systemic crisis was defined as aggregate capital W falling below a
certain threshold fraction of assets z in section 2.2.1. In this framework, a
systemic crisis is characterized by an equity market decline, denoted by C.
The decline happens over a time horizon h. The market return over the period
from t+1 to t+h is denoted Rmt+1:t+h, and the systemic crisis is thus the event
{Rmt+1:t+h < C}. The derivation of the SRISK measure follows intuitively
from these, and is presented in section 3.2.2.
Brownlees and Engle introduce the concept of long-run marginal expected
shortfall (LRMES), which is defined as
LRMESit = −Et(Rit+1:t+h|Rmt+1:t+h < C). (16)
It is simply the expected negative return on a firm’s equity conditional on
a systemic event, and is an essential component of SRISK. However, its es-
timation involves significant complexities as it is a forward-looking measure.
Estimating future returns in the financial markets requires models of the asset
price development and assumptions about the distribution of future returns.
The empirical analysis in this thesis shows that the choice of model may have
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a significant impact on the SRISK estimation results. I discuss different ap-
proaches to estimating LRMES in section 3.2.4.
As demonstrated in the framework presented in section 2, there is a con-
nection between systematic risk and systemic risk. Systematic risk in financial
markets is often estimated with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), and
specifically its parameter β. This is also true for SRISK. The Capital Asset
Pricing Model states that the return ra of an asset a can be represented as
ra = rf + β(rm − rf ), (17)
where rf is the risk-free rate and rm is the (expected) market return. The
parameter β can be estimated with a simple regression of the asset return
above the risk-free rate on the market return above the risk-free rate, and it
measures the sensitivity of the asset returns to market return. The β can be
referred to as a measure of market risk or systematic risk, or simply the CAPM
beta. For a more thorough description, see e.g. Howells and Bain, 2008 (pp.
192 – 195).
An important distinction to be made when studying systemic risk measures
over time is between cross-section and time-series dimensions. The time-series
dimension describes the evolution of a measure over time, and in the case of
SRISK, can be presented for a single institution or for the whole group of
institutions as an aggregate measure. The cross-sectional dimension, on the
other hand, describes the value of the measure across different institutions at a
certain point in time. Both dimensions are important in the empirical studies.
3.2 SRISK
The SRISK measure was initially introduced in the papers by Acharya et al.
(2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2017), and it provides some improvements
to earlier measures of systemic risk.
A closely related measure of systemic risk is the systemic expected shortfall
(SES, Acharya et al., 2017).6 SES is also defined with the help of the framework
presented in section 2.2.1, but it differs a bit from SRISK. As explained by
Brownlees and Engle, estimating SES requires an observation of systemic risk
6The precise definitions of SES and MES are not in the scope of this paper, nor important
for the understanding of the differences between SES and SRISK, so they are left out. The
article by Acharya et al. (2017) provides the definitions for those who are interested in a
more detailed explanation. MES is defined analogously to LRMES, but for a time period of
one day and usually with a value-at-risk interpretation of the threshold.
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realization. Thus, it can’t be used for ex-ante measurement, and, as shown in
their paper, SRISK can predict systemic crises significantly better than SES.
Another weakness of SES is that it requires assuming the structural framework
described in section 2.2.1 of this paper. A benefit of SRISK is that while that
framework presents an intuitive way of understanding the context and issues
related to systemic risk, SRISK generalizes the notion of systemic risk so that
all the assumptions of the structure of financial institutions and the system
presented above are not necessary.
SRISK also incorporates more information than SES. SES is a purely
market-based measure, but SRISK takes also balance sheet information into
account. This allows capturing the effects the size and the leverage of the
institution have on its systemic risk contribution, while still relying on public
data only.
The SRISK also presents an alternative to the risk weights used in the Basel
capital requirements, which Acharya et al. (2012) note as widely criticized. The
Basel risk weights attempt to capture the risk in the assets an institution holds,
and thus determine the capital requirement for the institution. According to
Acharya et al., the LRMES component of SRISK incorporates the risks of
underlying assets, and the SRISK as a whole complements the risk weight
approach by taking into account the risk contribution of the institution itself.
3.2.1 Earlier Assessments and Limitations
The shortfall-based measures and also SRISK in particular have been discussed
in numerous studies. In this section, I present a brief overview on earlier
evaluations of the SRISK measure. I focus on the benefits and shortcomings
found in SRISK, without trying to present a complete review of the empirical
literature.
Obviously, the benefits of SRISK are argued for in the paper by Brownlees
and Engle where SRISK is presented. They conduct two empirical tests of
SRISK and find that its improvements to existing measures are not limited to
theoretical aspects.
First, Brownlees and Engle study whether SRISK can be used as a predictor
of capital injections by the Federal Reserve (Fed). They use a Tobit regression
that determines the capital injection CI∗i a firm i receives as follows:
log CI∗i = α0 + α log(1 + (SRISKi)+) + γ
′xi + i, (18)
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where x+ denotes max{x, 0}, xi is a vector of control explanatory variables
and i is a Gaussian error term. The observed capital injection is thus
log CIi =
log CI∗i if log CI∗i > 00 otherwise. (19)
This model is then estimated with a maximum likelihood method that finds
the parameters that maximize the likelihood of making the observations, using
data after March 2008. The authors find that when SRISK, SES, and ES
(expected (capital) shortfall, proposed by Lehar, 2005) indicators of systemic
risk are separately included in the model, SRISK improves the pseudo R2 of
the regression above the baseline the most, even though the margin is not
very wide.7 When they are included simultaneously, SRISK has the strongest
statistical significance of the three. That speaks in favor of SRISK versus the
other measures, but still doesn’t quite prove the usefulness of SRISK. However,
their conclusion from these results is that SRISK improves the prediction of
Fed capital injections during the latest financial crisis.
Their second assessment of the SRISK measure uses an OLS regression
model where macroeconomic variables – namely, industrial production and
unemployment rate – are separately regressed on lagged values of changes in
aggregate SRISK of the financial system. They find that after controlling for
many economic (mostly financial) variables, changes in the aggregate SRISK
predict changes in industrial production and the unemployment rate. These
empirical assessments allow Brownlees and Engle to conclude that SRISK is
useful in predicting systemic crises and specifically the bank-level contribu-
tions, as well as negative spillovers to the real economy.
Another assessment of the SRISK measure, conducted by Wu and Zhao
(2014), studies the predictive power of the aggregate SRISK on bank failures
in the United States. They study various alternative measures, such as CoVaR
(Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), DIP (Huang et al., 2012), and a set of
financial market variables, such as trailing bank equity returns, the LIBOR-
OIS spread, and the TED spread which all measure the perceived risk in banks.
They find support for all the measures predicting the number of bank failures.
Also, a study by Brownlees et al. (2015) on data for 60 years, beginning in
7 Pseudo R2 is a measure of goodness-of-fit and can be understood as the logistic equiv-
alent of the coefficient of determination (R2) in OLS regression.
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the 19th century, found SRISK useful in predicting conditions likely to cause
financial crises.
An important note here is that while the aggregate SRISK may be success-
ful in predicting economic downturns and even systemic crises and thus give
support to the intuition behind it, it is not a sufficient result from the regula-
tory perspective. The interest of the regulator is (at least here) in measuring
the systemic risk contributions of individual institutions, which the aggregate
SRISK measure can’t do by definition.
Idier et al. (2014) study the usefulness of the MES measure in predict-
ing systemic risk by using the latest financial crisis as a natural experiment.
They find little evidence in support of MES, and conclude that simple ratios
calculated from balance sheet data fare better. They also study SRISK and
find that it is not more useful than MES, which is interesting as SRISK is
specifically supposed to incorporate the balance sheet metrics into the esti-
mation. However, Idier et al. only measure realized systemic risk as realized
equity losses of 19 bank holding companies, which may be a somewhat limited
sample and context.
While the assessments presented here give cautious support for the use-
fulness of SRISK in quantifying systemic risk, there are still limitations that
may hamper its use in practice. One of them is that SRISK relies on equity
market data, which either calls for adjustments to account for e.g. coopera-
tive banks or prevents its use altogether. This issue must be solved before it
can be used as a basis for regulation. Also, SRISK may be criticized for not
incorporating various sources of systemic risk widely enough. As presented
in section 3.2.2, SRISK incorporates important characteristics that at least
theoretically predict systemic risk, such as the size of the institution and its
sensitivity to systemic shocks, but it implicitly relies on either market pricing
in or the balance sheet reflecting the systemic risk contribution arising from
the interconnectedness of financial institutions (described theoretically in sec-
tion 2.1.2). This may or may not be a problem, but one interpretation of the
results presented in section 4.2 is that SRISK fails to capture some facet of
systemic risk, and that may well be interconnectedness.
3.2.2 Definition
I now present the formal definition of the SRISK measure. This extends the
capital shortfall framework presented in section 3.1, and follows Brownlees and
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Engle. Using (15), SRISK for a firm i at time t is defined as
SRISKit = Et(CSit+h|Rmt+1:t+h < C)
= kEt(dit+h|Rmt+1:t+h < C)− (1− k)Et(wit+h|Rmt+1:t+h < C).
(20)
It is assumed that debt can’t be renegotiated in a crisis so its book value stays
constant:
Et(dit+h|Rmt+1:t+h < C) = dit+h. (21)
It follows from equations (16), (20), and (21) that
SRISKit = kdit − (1− k)wit(1− LRMESit)
= wit(kLVGit + (1− k)LRMESit − 1),
(22)
where LVGit denotes the quasi leverage ratio dit+witwit . The estimation of LRMES
is explained in section 3.2.4.
The SRISK measure can thus be understood as the expected capital short-
fall a firm would experience in the event of a systemic crisis. Even though
the intuition is fairly simple, the measurement is complicated by the estima-
tion of LRMES, as explained in section 3.1. SRISK can also be defined as an
aggregate measure for the financial sector (all N institutions) as follows:
SRISKt =
N∑
i=1
(SRISKit)+, (23)
where x+ denotes max{x, 0}. The aggregate SRISK can be thought of as the
capital needed for the government to bail out the financial system in the event
of a systemic crisis.
For a single institution, a nonpositive SRISK means that in the event of
crisis, the firm would still have enough capital to cover its prudential capital
requirement. The negative contributions are ignored in the calculation of the
aggregate SRISK as it is assumed that the “extra” capital in well-capitalized
firms could not be used to cover the shortfall of other firms. Note that this
definition addresses the criticism Chen et al. had regarding the “portfolio
approach” in the SES measure, as described in section 2.3.3.
SRISK can also be presented in a percentage form, as a systemic risk share
of a particular institution:
SRISK%it =
(SRISKit)+
SRISKt
. (24)
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While the exposition by Acharya et al. (2017), presented in section 2.2.1,
does not directly apply to SRISK, it still illustrates the kind of framework that
makes also SRISK intuitive and comprehensible. In that framework, SRISK
roughly corresponds to the equation (13). A part of the regulator’s problem is
thus to minimize SRISK, or the expected cost of a bailout in a systemic crisis.
Note that SRISK does not comment on the regulator’s problem any further,
e.g. regarding the actual social cost of obtaining the bailout funds (shadow
cost of public funds), while it may be included in a framework like the one in
section 2.2.1.
SRISK can be also applied as a stress test, as was done by Acharya et al.
(2014). This approach allows comparing capital requirements calculated with
SRISK to those calculated by regulators. They characterized the SRISK mea-
sure as a “mark-to-market” alternative to the regulatory tests that require
confidential data. The stress scenario of the SRISK test is determined through
the discretionary parameters described in section 3.2.3.
3.2.3 Parameter Specification
Following equation (22), the variables and parameters that determine the value
of the SRISK measure for an institution can be illustrated as follows:
SRISKit = f(LRMESit,LVGit, wit, k) (25)
In other words, SRISK is a function of
• LRMESit — the long-run marginal expected shortfall of the institution,
its estimation from financial market data is explained in section 3.2.4
• LVGit — the institution’s leverage, determined from its balance sheet
• wit — the value of the institution’s equity as determined by the equity
market
• k — the prudential capital ratio, determined by regulatory standards or
management practice
Also, two discretionary items affect LRMES as described in equation (16):
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• C — the equity market decline that characterizes a systemic crisis
• h — the time horizon for C
It is thus obvious that while the first three inputs to SRISK are determined by
figures that can be observed objectively, the parameters k, C, and h must be
determined by the regulator or assumed by the researcher in a non-regulatory
context. These parameters introduce discretion to the SRISK estimation, as
does the choice of the LRMES estimation method. From discretion, uncer-
tainty follows.
As emphasized in the paper by Hansen, an important part of evaluating
systemic risk measures is dealing with uncertainty. The possibility of choosing
“wrong” inputs should not be a reason to abstain from exercises in systemic
risk quantification, but the sensitivity of the measure to varying specifications
should be emphasized.
In their seminal paper on SRISK, Brownlees and Engle conduct a sensitivity
analysis regarding the prudential capital ratio k and the equity market decline
C characterizing a systemic crisis. From equation (20), and also intuitively,
it is evident that SRISK increases with k and decreases with C.8 Brownlees
and Engle study a baseline specification (k = 8%, C = −10%, h = 22 (days))
against two alternative specifications: k = 10%, C = −10%, h = 22, and
k = 8%, C = −20%, h = 22. They find that the Spearman rank correlation9
between the baseline and each of the alternatives is high and above 0.90 for the
majority of the cross-sections. However, especially institutions in the low end
of the rankings exhibit quite high sensitivity to the changes, while rankings for
those that are on the top and thus matter the most are relatively stable.
Of course, choices of the parameter values should have reasonable justifica-
tions. In the paper by Brownlees and Engle, the value k = 8% is justified by a
back-of-the-envelope estimation of the capital ratio of well-managed banks in
normal times. This value is also used as a default in the V-Lab (The Volatility
Institute, 2017) data, a project initiated by the same authors. It is a source
used in many systemic risk studies, so the use of k = 8% could be argued to
constitute a kind of standard. However, V-Lab uses k = 5.5% for European
institutions due to “differences in accounting standards”.
8Note that C, as an equity market decline, is expressed here, as in the paper by Brownlees
and Engle, as a negative value unlike LRMES, which also denotes a decline but is expressed
as a positive value. This is just a matter of convention which should be kept in mind in order
to avoid unnecessary confusion. However, it is not consistently followed in the literature.
9For an explanation of the metric, see section 3.4.
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Brownlees and Engle argue that h should be “sufficiently long” and C “suf-
ficiently extreme”. This leaves much room for interpretation, but the general
idea is that the parameters should reflect the characteristics of a systemic crisis.
The observations from previous crises may give guidance for the estimation.
Brownlees and Engle use C = −10% and h = 22 (days) in their paper as the
default specification, V-Lab uses C = −40%, h = 6 (months), and Benoit et al.
use C = −2.52%, h = 1 (day), for example. In a real-world setting, the regula-
tor should take the expected cost of the systemic risk externality into account
when choosing the discretionary parameters of SRISK.
3.2.4 Estimating LRMES
There are at least three principal methods of estimating LRMES, all presented
in the paper by Brownlees and Engle. I summarize these methods in this
section.
The method Brownlees and Engle use as the default in their paper is a
simulation method incorporating a GARCH-DCC model (Engle, 2002, 2009).
The algorithm is appended to their paper, and I will not go through it here. For
short, the approach involves specifying time-varying volatility and correlation
dynamics of an institution’s stock and the equity market, which are estimated
from historical financial market data. Using the estimated parameters, a Monte
Carlo simulation of the institution’s equity returns, conditional on a systemic
event {Rmt+1:t+h < C}, is performed. This model can incorporate many of the
stylized facts in the data.
An alternative to this method is a time-varying copula model described
by Patton (2006). In this approach, a copula function is specified to link the
institution’s equity returns with the market. It includes a parameter that can
be specified to determine the dependence of the two in the lower tail of returns,
which is a specific merit in it that Brownlees and Engle point out.
However, the method I focus on here is one that Brownlees and Engle call
the static bivariate normal model. This approach assumes that the firm’s and
the market’s logarithmic equity returns are independent and identically dis-
tributed from a bivariate normal distribution with zero mean. The estimation
requires calculating the market volatility, the firm volatility, and correlation
parameters σm, σi, and ρim, respectively, from historical financial market data.
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Using these parameters, the CAPM beta for the firm’s stock is as follows:
βi = ρim
σi
σm
. (26)
In this model, LRMES can be approximated10 as follows:
LRMESit = −
√
hβiE(rmt+1|rmt+1 < c), (27)
where
E(rmt+1|rmt+1 < c) = −σm
φ
(
c
σm
)
Φ
(
c
σm
) ,
where φ(x) is the standard normal probability density function and
c =
log(1 + C)√
h
.
However, it is further simplified in the V-Lab environment as
LRMESit = 1− exp(log(1− C)× β), (28)
which I shall refer to as static LRMES from now on. This definition assumes
a constant h = 6 months.
According to the V-Lab documentation, this formulation allows for “trans-
parency, reproducibility, and flexibility”, and it makes the maths here a bit
easier to understand. In section 4, I present the results of my analysis on
whether this formulation that connects SRISK to systematic risk in quite a
direct way still allows making the distinction between systematic risk and sys-
temic risk and producing otherwise meaningful results.
A variant of the static LRMES, with h = 6 months and C = −40%, is
10 LRMES has the following exact closed-form solution:
LRMESit = − exp
(
h
2
(β2σ2m + (1− ρ2)σ2i )
) Φ(β log(1+C)−hβ2σ2m√
hβσm
)
1
2 +
1
2 erf
(
β log(1+C)√
2
√
hβσm
) + 1,
where erf(x) is the error function and Φ(x) is the standard normal cumulative distribution
function.
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presented by Acharya et al. (2012). It defines the LRMES as
LRMESit = 1− exp(−18×MESit), (29)
where MESit is the one-day expected loss if the market return is less than
−2%.
With LRMES defined as in (28), the SRISK illustration in (25) can be
reformulated as
SRISKit = f(LVGit, βit, wit, k, C). (30)
Brownlees and Engle present a comparison of the three methods for cal-
culating SRISK. They compare them pairwise using a Granger causality test,
based on a predictive regression
∆ log SRISKAt+1 = α0 + α∆ log SRISK
A
t + β∆ log SRISK
B
t + ut, (31)
where ∆ log SRISKAt and ∆ log SRISK
B
t denote changes in log aggregate SRISK
based on alternative LRMES estimators A and B, respectively, and ut is the
error term.
LRMES based on estimator B is said to lead the LRMES based on estimator
A if the regression coefficient β is significantly different from zero. The intuition
is that if B leads A, then B will provide information about the evolution
of the SRISK measure before A. If an estimator is not lead by any other
estimator, Brownlees and Engle call it a timely estimator. They perform this
regression for each pair of the three estimators, and find that the simulation-
based (GARCH-DCC) estimator of LRMES (I will call it simulated LRMES
from now on) is not lead by any other estimator, but leads them. The static
LRMES is found to be lead by the others and not to lead either one of the
other measures. They also report a rank correlation analysis similar to the
one conducted with the k and C parameters, and find that the correlations
are quite high, ranging from 0.74 to 1.00, but that the differences between the
LRMES estimators are particularly pronounced during the crisis period.
Brownlees and Engle conclude that the static LRMES does not provide
a timely measure of SRISK. They also note that the specification (27) has
a negative approximation error and should only be used for a short horizon.
They also conclude that the simulated LRMES is a particularly useful estima-
tor. The conclusion that static LRMES has shortcomings is supported by the
results presented in section 4.
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3.3 Data
The main source of the data in the empirical section of this thesis is the V-Lab
(2017) website of The Volatility Institute of New York University Stern School
of Business. Created under the direction of Nobel Laureate, Professor Robert
F. Engle, the service reports various measures related to volatility, liquidity,
and other important market variables. It also publishes data on systemic risk,
and is updated daily.
The systemic risk data, which is focused on the SRISK measure, is com-
posed in accordance to the SRISK framework I have presented in section 3.2.
There are three datasets: one for U.S. financial institutions using the static
LRMES estimator, one for global (non-U.S.) financial institutions, also with
static LRMES, and one for U.S. financials with the simulated LRMES.
In my empirical analysis, I study specifically the static LRMES data for
U.S. financials. There is a handful of reasons for this choice. An important
reason is that the sheer variety of the proposed estimators for LRMES presents
a challenge for researchers and regulators. Different methods of estimating
LRMES coexist in the literature, yet there seems to be very limited literature
on the merits and shortcomings of these methods. Knowing which LRMES
estimator to use, and why, would be very relevant information for anybody
studying SRISK, especially considering the differences between the estimators
pointed out by Brownlees and Engle.
It is reasonable to assume that the V-Lab data holds a special position as
a data source for the SRISK literature. Not only is the project initiated by
the people behind SRISK itself, but it also provides an extensive dataset that
caters well to the needs of systemic risk research. While it is difficult to exactly
measure how many studies have taken their data from the V-Lab service, it
is easy to find several such papers. However, it seems that the limitations
regarding the LRMES estimator are not widely considered, or at least not
reported in the papers using the V-Lab data. One paper (Pierret, 2015) chooses
the static LRMES corresponding to (29) for U.S. banks without any reported
justification, while the simulated LRMES would have been available. Some
papers, such as one by Kim et al. (2016), doesn’t even report which definition
of LRMES, and thus SRISK, they use. Also, specifically for non-U.S. studies,
the choice of using V-Lab data means choosing to use the static LRMES. For
an example of these see e.g. Nucera et al. (2016). The situation is further
complicated by the fact that the formula for the static LRMES was changed
in V-Lab from (29) to (28) at some point in time. The specification (28) itself
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has not been discussed in any theoretical literature, but only in the V-Lab
documentation, where it is justified with mainly practical aspects.
The choice of LRMES estimation method is particularly important when
considered from the regulatory perspective. Suppose that based on favorable
analyses of the SRISK measure in the literature, the regulator chose SRISK to
form the basis for a tax or a capital requirement. Now, as a real-world example
from the V-Lab data I study, the SRISK calculated for J.P.Morgan on 31
December 2015 with the static LRMES is USD 53.7 billion. This denotes the
amount of additional capital the firm would need if a systemic crisis hit, and in
order to mitigate the effect for the real economy stemming from this expected
capital shortfall, the regulator would impose a tax or a capital requirement that
would take into account the magnitude of the expected shortfall. However, the
corresponding figure calculated with the simulated LRMES is 75.7 billion, 22
billion dollars higher! This example illustrates that the differences between
different LRMES estimators should be studied carefully if SRISK was to be
promoted as a viable measure of systemic risk for regulatory purposes.
By studying the data composed with the static LRMES estimator, I hope
to shed light on its viability as a basis for SRISK for regulatory purposes. I
also hope to contribute to the overall understanding of the SRISK measure.
The main dataset I use is based on the Systemic Risk Analysis: U.S. fi-
nancials dataset with the static LRMES estimator, provided on the V-Lab
website. I have extracted monthly data for the period December 2001 – Jan-
uary 2017, or 182 time periods. The data corresponds to the last business day
of the month, and is estimated recursively, i.e. using only data available at the
specific date. The dataset includes figures for 97 major U.S. financial firms,
but some of the firms don’t have observations for the whole timeframe, as they
may have gone bankrupt or have been founded after 2001. In total, there are
14837 observations of each variable.
The variables collected and calculated by V-Lab include the following:
• SRISK — as defined in (22) with k = 8%, h = 6 months, and C = −40%,
in millions of U.S. dollars (MUSD).
• SRISK% — as defined in (24), in percent.
• LRMES — as defined in (28), in percent.
• Beta — as defined in (26), where the market corresponds to the S&P 500
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index, a widely followed benchmark of approximately 500 U.S. companies
with a high market capitalization (total equity value).
• Cor — dynamic conditional correlation between the equity return on an
institution’s stock and the return on the S&P 500 index, estimated with
a DCC model.11
• Vol — annualized volatility of an institution’s stock, estimated with a
GJR-GARCH model (Engle, 2002, 2009), in percent.
• Lvg — as defined in section 3.2.2.
Summary statistics for some of the variables are presented in table 1.
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
SRISK, MUSD 1027 21617 −205140 161421
LRMES, % 44.5 13.2 −21.4 100
Beta 1.226 0.638 −0.38 31.4
Cor 0.594 0.145 −0.13 0.92
Vol, % 34.5 37.2 0 2029
Lvg 8.2 38.3 1 4106
Table 1: Summary statistics for the main dataset. N=14837 for each variable.
I have also calculated the aggregate SRISK, using (23). It is presented in
figure 1.
There are three reasons for the choice of U.S. data instead of the global
dataset. First, using the U.S. data allows making a comparison between the
static and simulated LRMES estimators. Second, for example one of the
most important European banks, Crédit Agricole, has a complex organiza-
tional structure with both listed and cooperative entities that may affect the
reliability of the SRISK figures calculated from the data of the main holding
company. Also, in the V-Lab data, some of the local banks that are both own-
ers and clients of the cooperative are reported separately. The third reason for
using U.S. data is that I find it reasonable to assume that the U.S.–based team
has put less effort into dealing with this kind of idiosyncracies in the European
dataset than into composing the U.S. one.
11I don’t consider it necessary to discuss this in more detail as the variable is not directly
used in my analysis.
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Figure 1: Aggregate SRISK in the financial system over time.
For the purpose of making comparisons, I extend my data with alternative
indicators of systemic risk. I use the Financial Stability Board’s 2016 list of
global systemically important banks (FSB, 2016) as one point of comparison.
The data contains a list of 30 financial institutions from North America, Eu-
rope, and Asia, that are categorized into four buckets according to the BCBS
(2013) scoring methodology briefly presented in section 2.3.3. According to
the BCBS, the scores are supposed to reflect “the size of banks, their inter-
connectedness, the lack of readily available substitutes or financial institution
infrastructure for the services they provide, their global (cross-jurisdictional)
activity and their complexity”. This classification, based on data gathered on
31 December 2015, is presented for U.S. firms in table 3.
I also use the V-Lab data for the 31 December 2015 cross-section for non-
U.S. institutions and U.S. institutions with simulated LRMES in the com-
parisons. The variables are the same as in the main dataset with the slight
differences discussed above.
3.4 Estimation
The purpose of this study is to find out if the SRISK measure with a static
LRMES estimator could serve as a useful measure of systemic risk. The useful-
ness of a particular measure can be determined in many ways as described in
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section 2.4, but the approach I take is that I try to find out whether the SRISK
measure could provide information not available from a purely market-based
measure (CAPM beta), and if the SRISK estimates of systemic risk correspond
to the regulatory classification.
I would consider SRISK probably useful if I found that it both
1. provides rankings that differ from CAPM beta by emphasizing institu-
tions that reflect the characteristics of systemic risk (e.g. size, leverage,
interconnectedness), and
2. provides rankings that roughly correspond to those provided by the reg-
ulators.
It would also have to be able to provide this without being totally explained
by one of its constituents (e.g. leverage), in which case only the constituent
indicator could be considered a probably useful measure.
The finding that the SRISK measure is probably useful would not be a
total guarantee of its usefulness, and further research would still be required.
On the other hand, the finding that SRISK either has almost one-to-one cor-
respondence with the CAPM beta, or that its predictions are totally different
from the ones provided by the regulators, would cast a serious doubt on its use-
fulness and serve as evidence of SRISK with static LRMES being a suboptimal
estimator of systemic risk.
Having an estimator that can reliably identify the institutions that are
most important systemically would be very beneficial for the regulator, and
correspondence to the current regulatory rankings would indicate that SRISK
could work as a measure of systemic risk. However, it is a completely different
question whether the absolute level of SRISK gives useful information for the
regulator. As it is virtually impossible to determine ex ante, researchers need to
conduct analyses of past capital injections like the one presented by Brownlees
and Engle, for example. I limit my analysis to the rankings, as I consider that
an intuitive starting point for the evaluation.
Benoit et al. conduct a simple analysis where they compare the systemic
risk rankings of institutions provided by the CAPM beta and a variant of the
MES measure. They find that the two are highly correlated, and they consider
that worrisome for a number of reasons. If the correlation is very high, the
same result that could be achieved with MES could be achieved with beta in
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a more simple way. However, it is known that beta is not a good measure of
systemic risk, as it doesn’t capture many of the important sources of systemic
risk such as the size of the institution. This diminishes the credibility of MES
as a systemic risk measure, too. Another reasons include the introduction
of confusion between systematic and systemic risk, and procyclicality. In the
latest financial crisis, for example, betas increased notably and a measure that
is found to be highly correlated with betas would be inherently procyclical,
and if used as a basis for a tax, it could further aggravate the crisis. I present
a similar analysis for SRISK and the CAPM beta.
Brownlees and Engle present a ranking comparison between SRISK and a
selection of alternative indicators using the Spearman rank correlation coeffi-
cient (Spearman, 1904). The Spearman rank correlation coefficient (or Spear-
man’s ρ) for two variables is calculated by ranking the variables and calculating
the standard Pearson correlation coefficient (Pearson, 1895) for the ranks. It
is a common non-parametric measure of correlation, and, as opposed to the
Pearson’s ρ, can capture non-linear correlation as well. I compare the rankings
for financial institutions according to alternative measures with the rankings
provided by SRISK using Spearman’s ρ.
Another non-parametric correlation measure is the Kendall rank correlation
coefficient or Kendall’s τ (Kendall, 1938). Its calculation involves ordering the
two sets into pairs and counting the different pairs between the two sets of pairs.
The resulting coefficient takes values from −1 to 1, with 1 denoting identical
orderings, −1 totally reverse orderings, and 0 that the sets are independent. It
can be interpreted in a probabilistic way as the probability difference between
the two sets being actually in the same order, or
τ = P (same)− P (different).
For a more detailed explanation, see e.g. Abdi (2007).
In order to demonstrate the linear relationships between different variables,
I also report some OLS regressions. All the analysis is conducted using the
R statistical language (R Core Team, 2016) with the help of the RStudio
environment (RStudio Team, 2016). I illustrate the analysis with graphs and
figures I have drawn using the ggplot2 package for R (Wickham, 2009).
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4 Results
In this section, I present the results of my analysis.
4.1 Systemic vs. Systematic
In order to be a useful systemic risk measure, SRISK should be able to provide
some information not available from using just a systematic risk measure, such
as the CAPM beta. In the paper by Benoit et al., high linear correlation
between the CAPM beta and the MES measure is found to severely restrict
the usefulness of MES as a systemic risk measure, and I present here a similar
analysis for SRISK. An OLS regression of the long-term arithmetic mean of
SRISK on the long-term arithmetic mean of the CAPM beta across the 97
institutions is reported in table 2 and illustrated in figure 2.
There is a significant and positive relationship between the CAPM beta
and SRISK, which is not surprising as beta is a component of SRISK through
the LRMES. However, the coefficient of determination (R2) is quite low, 0.17,
which suggests that SRISK may be able to incorporate more information than
just the systematic risk component of systemic risk. The illustration in figure
2 supports this point of view.
Dependent variable:
SRISK, MUSD
CAPM beta 21633∗∗∗
(4928)
Constant −25016∗∗∗
(6216)
Observations 97
R2 0.169
Adjusted R2 0.160
Residual Std. Error 14243 (df = 95)
F Statistic 19.274∗∗∗ (df = 1; 95)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2: Results from the OLS regression of SRISK on CAPM beta, both
taking their long-term average over the whole time-series in the main dataset.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 2: CAPM beta and SRISK, average cross-section. The line corresponds
to the regression reported in table 2, and the shaded area is the 95% confidence
region.
Figure 3: CAPM beta and SRISK, time series for Bank of America.
Even though the connection between the CAPM beta and SRISK is signif-
icant in the OLS regression, beta is unable to predict a significant number of
the observations, including the ones with the highest average SRISK. Of the 12
institutions with the highest SRISK (and thus systemic importance), only one
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(Lehman Brothers) is within the 95% confidence region for the estimator, as
seen in figure 2. A reader familiar with the history of the 2007–2009 financial
crisis will recognize several names of failed institutions among the ones with
the highest SRISK measures.
Benoit et al. show that there is a proportional relationship between the
∆CoVaR measure and an entirely market-based measure of tail risk, VaR.
This supports the notion that the variation in ∆CoVaR across the time series
dimension can be entirely captured by VaR, similarly as the variation in MES
is found to be captured by the CAPM beta across the cross-section. An an
illustrative example, figure 3 presents the time series of both CAPM beta and
SRISK for Bank of America, showing that the relationship between beta and
SRISK is not constant across the time-series. The case is similar for other
institutions in the sample as well.
While not proving that SRISK is a good measure of systemic risk, these
cross-sectional and time-series characteristics demonstrate that it may be able
to evade the criticism presented by Benoit et al. regarding some alternative
measures of systemic risk. These preliminary results thus suggest that SRISK
might prove useful, and are supportive of further analysis.
4.2 Comparisons with Alternative Measures
I now compare the rankings provided by the SRISK measure to possible al-
ternatives using the cross-sectional data from 31 December 2015. The chosen
date corresponds to the date of the latest FSB G-SIB data.
Figure 4 corresponds to figure 2, but for the single cross section on 31
December 2015. Some specific institutions that rank high according to beta,
SRISK, and the G-SIB list are named. The overall picture of the relationship
is very similar to figure 2.
Table 3 presents rankings of some of the most important U.S. financial in-
stitutions on 31 December 2015 according to alternative measures of systemic
risk. Note that while beta is not a systemic risk measure, it is included for
comparison. The table includes top 10 institutions according to the two dif-
ferent variants of SRISK based on the LRMES estimation method and beta,
as well as all U.S. institutions featured in the FSB list of global systemati-
cally important banks. The G-SIB list is presented in categories, or buckets,
where a higher bucket number denotes higher systemic importance and risk.
From the table and figure 4, it is apparent that ranking institutions on betas
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provides very different results than ranking them on either version of SRISK.
In this cross-section, the two versions of SRISK create fairly similar rankings,
and the higher G-SIB buckets roughly correspond to higher SRISK rankings.
Note that the G-SIB list only includes banks.
Figure 4: CAPM beta and SRISK as of 31 December 2015.
The possible relationship between SRISK and the G-SIB buckets warrants
further consideration. For this analysis, I use a dataset that is combined of
the main dataset, the global financials dataset from V-Lab and the G-SIB list.
The G-SIB list includes 30 institutions, but I exclude Groupe BPCE as it is
not included in the V-Lab dataset.12
Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between the G-SIB buckets and SRISK
figures, and the corresponding OLS regression is reported in table 4. SRISK is
regressed on the G-SIB buckets, and the intuition is that if the G-SIB buckets
are assumed to be a reliable indicator of systemic risk, a higher bucket should
translate into a higher SRISK, and the beta coefficient of the regression would
determine how big an increase in SRISK corresponds to a step to a higher
G-SIB bucket.
12Its subsidiary Natixis is.
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Institution SRISK
ranking
(static)
SRISK
ranking
(simu-
lated)
Beta
ranking
FSB
G-SIB
bucket
Bank of America 1 2 18 3
Citigroup 2 3 23 4
J.P.Morgan 3 1 33 4
Prudential 4 5 15 —
MetLife 5 4 21 —
Morgan Stanley 6 6 4 1
Goldman Sachs 7 7 9 2
Lincoln Financial Group 8 8 10 —
Principal Financial Group 9 10 3 —
The Hartford 10 11 34 —
Genworth 11 13 1 —
BNY Mellon 12 12 16 1
State Street 13 14 13 1
Capital One 23 9 46 —
Janus Capital Group 32 36 2 —
Legg Mason 37 39 5 —
Charles Schwab 52 51 6 —
BlackRock 57 37 8 —
Franklin Resources 58 61 7 —
Wells Fargo 71 23 45 2
Table 3: Systemic risk rankings for a selection of U.S. financial institutions on
31 December 2015 according to various measures. The main dataset includes
74 institutions. Note that a higher bucket number indicates higher systemic
importance, as opposed to the rankings, where a smaller number indicates a
higher ranking.
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Figure 5: The relationship between SRISK figures and the G-SIB buckets,
using 31 December 2015 data.
Dependent variable:
SRISK, MUSD
G-SIB bucket 5495
(7034)
Constant 43489∗∗∗
(13637)
Observations 29
R2 0.022
Adjusted R2 −0.014
Residual Std. Error 36008 (df = 27)
F Statistic 0.610 (df = 1; 27)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4: Regression of SRISK on the G-SIB buckets.
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The results from the regression, reported in table 4, show that there is no
significant relationship between the G-SIB buckets and the SRISK figures for
the 29 institutions included in the combined dataset. The coefficient of deter-
mination is very low and the Pearson correlation between the two variables is
only 0.15 and insignificant, having a p-value of 0.44.
Many of the ranks are tied in the G-SIB data because of the bucketing
approach, but the Kendall’s τ can be used as an alternative to the Spearman’s
ρ in such a case (see e.g. Field et al., 2012, p. 225). The estimated Kendall’s
τ between the G-SIB buckets and SRISK is only 0.13, with a p-value of 0.40,
so there is no significant correlation. At least in this sample, it thus seems
that either SRISK or the G-SIB list is unable to identify the variation in
the systemic importance of some of the possibly most systemically important
institutions. Furthermore, if the G-SIB buckets are believed to be able to
capture the cross-sectional differences in systemic risk, it must be concluded
that at least here, SRISK is not. That would call its usefulness into serious
question.
I now turn to comparing the SRISK measure with the other measures
reported in the V-Lab dataset that serve as its constituents. The approach I
take here is the same as presented by Brownlees and Engle.
Figure 6: Rank correlation over time between SRISK and three different risk
indicators: LRMES, firm leverage, and volatility. Black line denotes the Spear-
man correlation coefficient and gray line is the p-value. Except for periods with
a very low correlation, the value of the correlation coefficient between SRISK
and the risk indicator is statistically significant at 0.01 significance level.
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Figure 7: SRISK plotted against leverage on 31 December 2015: many insti-
tutions rank high on both measures, but not necessarily in the same order.
Figure 6 presents the Spearman’s ρ between SRISK and LRMES, leverage,
and the volatility of the firm’s stock over time. The correlation coefficient
is calculated separately for each time period. As the Spearman’s ρ considers
ranks, the results for LRMES and beta are equivalent in accordance to (28).
The time series for the correlations with their respective p-values show that
the significance and magnitude of the correlation vary quite much across time
and the variables. The correlation between SRISK and leverage is quite high
and p < 0.01 for the whole timeframe, while in the correlations with LRMES
and with the equity volatility there is more variation. A notable feature is that
all correlations rise at the onset of the 2007–2009 financial crisis.
The reported correlations are higher and more significant than those re-
ported by Brownlees and Engle for the SRISK with simulated LRMES and the
same three variables. It is also very interesting to note that the figures they
report for SRISK–leverage and SRISK–LRMES correlations decrease towards
zero at the onset of the crisis and never exceed 0.40. The SRISK–volatility
correlation is almost never significant and hovering around zero in their study.
Figure 7 presents the cross-sectional scatterplot of SRISK and leverage
on 31 December 2015. The Spearman correlation is 0.81, and many of the
highest-ranking institutions are the same when measured with leverage and
SRISK. Even though they are not in the same order, the high correlation is
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a worrisome finding in the light of the criteria for the probable usefulness of
SRISK presented in section 3.4.
Figure 8: SRISK with simulated LRMES plotted against SRISK with static
LRMES on 31 December 2015.
Figure 8 presents a comparison of the SRISK measure estimated with the
two alternative LRMES estimators. It illustrates the negative approximation
error in the static LRMES estimator noted by Brownlees and Engle. The
Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.94, and the grey line denotes the equality
between the two measures. It is apparent that the SRISK approximated with
the static LRMES is a biased estimator of the simulated SRISK, giving mostly
lower SRISK estimates. For the purposes of regulation, too low estimates may
be harmful if they leave some systemic risk effects being uncaptured.
The figure 9 and the table 5 report the relationship between the G-SIB
buckets and the U.S. institutions for which SRISK with simulated LRMES is
available. The Pearson correlation between the two variables is 0.82, having
a p-value of 0.012, but any inferences about the relationship should be very
cautious as the sample is very small. Also, the corresponding relationship
with static LRMES and only U.S. institutions (not reported) doesn’t look
very different.
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Figure 9: The relationship between SRISK figures with simulated LRMES and
the G-SIB buckets, using 31 December 2015 data.
Dependent variable:
SRISK, MUSD
G-SIB bucket 19970∗∗
(5621)
Constant −8584
(14330)
Observations 8
R2 0.678
Adjusted R2 0.624
Residual Std. Error 19061 (df = 6)
F Statistic 12.624∗∗ (df = 1; 6)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5: Regression of SRISK with simulated LRMES on the G-SIB buckets.
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5 Discussion
I now discuss the interpretation of the above results, their significance, and
limitations of the study. I also present some thoughts on the shortcomings of
the SRISK measure and how it could be improved.
5.1 Interpretation of the Results
The results suggest that there are significant limitations to the usefulness of
SRISK with static LRMES as a measure of systemic risk. Even though it
is able to differ from the CAPM beta, a purely systematic risk measure, it
has a very weak relationship with the regulatory rankings (buckets) of global
systemically important banks and exhibits a high correlation with leverage,
one of its constituents. The results thus seem to suggest that the rankings
provided by SRISK with static LRMES could be quite closely replicated by
just using an institution’s leverage as a systemic risk measure. However, as
discussed in this thesis, there are several driving forces behind systemic risk,
of which leverage is only one.
The results can be compared with those obtained by Brownlees and En-
gle for the SRISK measure with simulated LRMES. They, too, find that the
Spearman correlation between SRISK and leverage is significant, yet it is much
lower than what is observed here. It seems that their measure coincides with
the constituents of SRISK in a different way, even though the formula is the
same.
Brownlees and Engle also find that the simulated estimator exhibits lower
correlations with its constituents and alternative measures (such as SRISK
with static LRMES) during the 2007–2009 crisis period. This is a promising
finding compared to the results presented in this work, as rising correlations
to rising market measures during crisis introduce harmful procyclicality to the
measure.
It is an interesting finding that even though these two variants of SRISK
appear superficially to be the same measure, their more careful analysis re-
veals significant differences in how they relate to their underlying components.
This highlights the importance of careful analysis of the underlying model
specification when applying these measures in practice. In addition to their
internal mechanisms, the actual results of the shortfall estimations conducted
with these alternative SRISK specifications may differ greatly, as evidenced
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e.g. by figure 8.
Even though there appear to be significant shortcomings in the SRISK
measure with the static LRMES estimator, it might still provide some ad-
ditional information about the systemic risk of institutions when compared
with e.g. the CAPM beta. However, all the results suggest that the simu-
lated SRISK is more useful and further research should concentrate on that
measure. Researchers on the topic should also be very careful when making
inferences based on the static estimator of SRISK, and the justification for
the LRMES estimator choice should be clearly discussed. An interesting topic
for further research would be to study how sensitive the simulated LRMES
itself is to reasonable changes in the underlying asset price simulation model
specification.
As illustrated by figure 5 and the corresponding regression reported in
table 4, the relationship between the regulatory buckets and the SRISK figures
is very weak. This can be interpreted so that SRISK may not be able to
capture the variation in the systemic risk contributions across institutions very
accurately, even though the institutions in the G-SIB list generally rank in the
higher end of the SRISK-based list (see table 3). These results don’t confirm
the notion that the simulated SRISK corresponds to the regulatory buckets
any better than the static one.
Some possible reasons for these differences between SRISK and the reg-
ulatory approach can be found by looking at the methodological differences
between these models. While the regulatory approach is not trying to esti-
mate the expected capital shortfall of the institutions, the risk of a bank’s
failure is inherently linked to the lack of capital. It thus seems reasonable
to assume that in essence, SRISK and the regulatory buckets are trying to
measure the same thing. However, the submeasures included in these two ap-
proaches differ somewhat. As seen in (30), SRISK incorporates the leverage
(LVGit), size (wit), and the systematic risk of an institution (βit), while the reg-
ulatory buckets take into account “the size of banks, their interconnectedness,
the lack of readily available substitutes or financial institution infrastructure
for the services they provide, their global (cross-jurisdictional) activity and
their complexity” (BCBS, 2013). It can be argued that the categories must be
at least somewhat overlapping, but not totally.
As discussed in section 3.2.1, in order to capture the portion of systemic risk
arising from the interconnectedness of an institution, it should be implicitly
included in LVGit, wit, or βit. However, it is not at all evident that any of these
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variables should vary according to the interconnectedness of an institution, or
that two institutions having similar levels of these variables would exhibit a
similar level of interconnectedness within the financial system. Alternatively,
the interconnectedness should have an impact on the probability of the sys-
temic event {Rmt+1:t+h < C}, and it is evident from the formula for static
LRMES (28) that the interconnectedness is not accounted for explicitly. The
simulation framework described in more detail in the paper by Brownlees and
Engle doesn’t consider the interconnectedness of the institutions per se either,
but relies on firm-market correlations in modeling the equity returns. It is not
entirely implausible that the interconnectedness of the financial institutions
would have a similar effect on both the systematic risk and the systemic risk
of the institutions, but it would nevertheless be quite a strong assumption that
would require an explicit justification.
As discussed in section 2.1.2, the structure of the network of links between
financial institutions may have effects on how large the systemic risk exter-
nalities are. It is thus possible that the usefulness of SRISK is restricted by
its lack of ability to incorporate the interconnectedness, or network, charac-
teristics of the financial system, which are explicitly accounted for in the FSB
G-SIB methodology.
The possibility of extending SRISK by incorporating network-based indi-
cators, such as centrality measures, should be considered. One way to account
for interconnectedness would be to model the financial network based on the
interbank exposures that financial institutions have. While quite possibly suf-
fering from practical difficulties, this kind of an approach might be able to
improve the accuracy of SRISK. Abbe et al. (2012) present the possibility of
calculating risk measures while maintaining privacy, and such methods might
provide a practically feasible way for the regulator to assess the interconnect-
edness of banks. However, more understanding on the effects of the structure
of the interbank network is needed before it can be used to accurately quantify
systemic risk in a framework like SRISK.
5.2 Limitations of the Study
There are some limitations to the interpretation and applicability of the results
of this study.
An obvious limitation is that comparing the SRISK figures to the regula-
tory buckets implies that the regulators have perfect knowledge of the level of
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systemic risk contributions of all these institutions. This is quite unrealistic,
given that there is no unified framework of determining how the sources of
systemic risk should translate into systemic risk contributions of individual
financial institutions. However, they might still give an approximation and
incorporate the best data and some of the most advanced understanding of
systemic risk that exists at the moment.
Also, no promising result of the usefulness of SRISK based on rankings
provided by the SRISK measure should be interpreted as SRISK providing
accurate data about the actual expected capital shortfalls. In other words, even
if SRISK happened to construct a ranking that would be deemed reasonable,
it might be that the absolute levels of SRISK didn’t provide almost any useful
information.
In the results presented above, some analyses of the 31 December 2015 data
were considered to support the notion that SRISK might not be useful. The
data is thus limited to only one point in time, and conducting several similar
analyses or more detailed comparisons of time series might still give evidence
in favor of SRISK. However, I consider it reasonable to expect that SRISK
should work at least reasonably well at every single point of time in order to
be considered a relevant measure from the regulatory perspective.
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6 Conclusion
As an inquiry into systemic risk and its measurement, I have presented an
empirical assessment of the SRISK measure of systemic risk, estimated with a
static estimator for the long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES) com-
ponent. I now summarize the conclusions of my analysis.
Previous literature has presented conflicting accounts of the usefulness of
SRISK, but the promising results obtained by e.g. Brownlees and Engle suggest
that the measure should not be abandoned but studied further. The empirical
literature, including evaluations, on SRISK is still quite limited and may suffer
to some extent from the lack of thorough understanding of the LRMES model
specification. The results presented in this study may help to guide further
research to acknowledge the limitations of the static LRMES estimator in
particular.
In my empirical analysis, I find that the systemic risk evaluations based
on the SRISK measure differ from the ones provided by the CAPM beta, a
popular measure of systematic risk. SRISK thus does not seem to suffer from
some of the criticism Benoit et al. directed towards e.g. the MES measure,
which they found unable to separate systemic risk from systematic risk.
I also find that different methods for estimating the long-run marginal
expected shortfall (LRMES) component of the SRISK measure have very
different dynamics regarding their effect on the rank correlations between
SRISK and its components. The correlation dynamics observed with the static
LRMES estimator, which is a function of the CAPM beta, introduce procycli-
cality to the SRISK measure and may also hamper its ability to separate
systemic and systematic risk. Furthermore, the absolute magnitudes of the
SRISK figures estimated with different estimators of the LRMES may differ
as much as tens of billions of U.S. dollars, which is alarmingly high. These
considerations should direct the attention of further research to the sensitivity
of SRISK to the LRMES model specification and the theoretical and empirical
validation of the chosen models.
Based on the analysis of the relationship between SRISK and the current
regulatory approach for identifying systemically important financial institu-
tions, as well as on theoretical analysis of the factors affecting SRISK, I can
also conclude that SRISK may not be sufficiently able to incorporate the sys-
temic risk effects stemming from the interconnectedness of the financial sys-
tem. As a possible solution to this problem, I propose further inquiry into
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network-based measures as addition to the SRISK model specification studied
here.
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